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I. INTRODUCTION 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, an early twentieth century jurist and 
Chief Justice to the Supreme Court of the United States, once said, 
“taxes are what we pay for civilized society.”1 This quote holds true 
now, more than ever, as developed countries like the United States 
(U.S.) and developing countries like Argentina are concerned with 
the deleterious social effects of tax evasion and the enforcement of 
tax compliance among their citizens and residents living or holding 
accounts abroad.2 In order to achieve global taxation, key countries 
and international organizations have pushed for more transparency 
and less bank secrecy in international banking in hopes of smoking 
out tax evaders.3 The key countries and international organizations, 
which have primarily led the push for less bank secrecy and more 
information sharing include the U.S., the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the European 
Union (EU).4 The impetus for concern over tax evasion is the 
amount of wealth, approximately $7.8 trillion, in accounts in foreign 
financial institutions.5 Traditionally, secret bank accounts in Carib-
bean jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands or a Swiss bank account 
                                                                                                             
 1 Tax Quotes, IRS (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/tax-
quotes. 
 2 See Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. 304, 306 (2012). 
 3 Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad: Rec-
onciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117, 141 (2014). 
 4 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 312 (explaining that the OECD started in 1960 
as a membership of eighteen European countries as well as the U.S. and Canada); 
See About the OECD: What We Do and How, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) (noting 
that now the OECD is a membership of thirty-five countries across the globe that 
represent the world’s most advanced economies and several emerging economies, 
such as Mexico, China, India, Brazil, and Turkey, and focused on securing eco-
nomic growth and financial stability, the OECD monitors events in member coun-
tries and provides peer reviews in order to provide insight into legal and policy 
corrective actions member states might take); About The EU: The EU in Brief, 
EUR. UNION (Apr. 7, 2018), https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-
brief_en. (noting that the EU is an economic and political union between twenty-
eight European countries established after the Second World War to promote eco-
nomic trade and interdependence and the avoidance of conflict). 
 5 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 306. 
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held in Switzerland are what come to mind when an “offshore ac-
count” is mentioned.6 In addition to residents of certain countries 
hiding money earned domestically overseas in foreign offshore ac-
counts, some countries such as the U.S. are also concerned with the 
vast amount of expatriates living and working abroad generating in-
come in other countries.7 Such expatriates are subject to taxation by 
virtue of their American citizenship regardless of the jurisdiction in 
which they reside.8 Consequently, for developed countries and in-
ternational organizations dominated by the perspectives of devel-
oped countries, “taxation is the only practical means of raising the 
revenue to finance government spending” on the social services they 
provide.9 The United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and France each lose 
about $100 billion in revenue each year from tax evasion, and the 
U.S. loses $377 billion in revenue a year.10 
The U.S. and the OECD developed the prevailing methods of 
tax compliance and enforcement in the international tax system that 
are currently in force: the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA) and the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), respec-
tively.11 FATCA requires tax authorities in other jurisdictions, 
namely foreign financial institutions (FFIs), to obtain detailed infor-
mation on financial accounts held by U.S. citizens and foreign enti-
ties with significant U.S. ownership and to report that information 
                                                                                                             
 6 CAB Concerned Over the Labeling of Fifteen Caribbean Countries as 
“Tax Havens” in the State of Illinois’ HB3419, CARIB. ASS’N OF BANKS (May 5, 
2017), http://cab-inc.com/cab-concerned-over-the-labelling-of-fifteen-caribbean-
countries-as-tax-havens-in-the-state-of-illinois-hb3419/; see also Robert W. 
Wood, Cayman Islands is The New Switzerland, But Not The Way You Think, 
FORBES (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rob-
ertwood/2014/04/18/cayman-islands-is-the-new-switzerland-but-not-the-way-
you-think/#4dc3762d6fd9. 
 7 Kirsch, supra note 3, at 120. 
 8 Id. at 119. 
 9 Vito Tanzi & Howell Zee, Tax Policy for Developing Countries, IMF (Mar. 
2001), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues27/. 
 10 Charles S. Jr. Bowen, There Are Many Ways to Catch FATCAts: What Im-
pact Will the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) Have on Caribbean 
Nations’ Privacy Laws and Costs Associated with Non-Compliance, 1 INDON. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 968, 973-74 (2014). 
 11 See Andy Mukherjee, Private Bankers, You Have Worse Coming, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-
10-02/private-bankers-you-have-a-worse-year-coming-don-t-fight-it. 
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back to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).12 The CRS, on the 
other hand, is an extensive reporting standard broader in scope than 
FATCA and is a mechanism for participating countries to share tax 
information of residents globally.13 CRS is broader in terms of the 
kind of financial information it seeks to collect, applies broadly to 
residents of any given participating country and not solely to citi-
zens, and applies to more categories of reporting entities than does 
FATCA.14 
Argentina is among the countries that have committed to both 
the CRS and FATCA.15 As a developing country, Argentina has 
much to gain from the automatic exchange of tax information 
(AEOI) and the implementation of these standards, namely, the 
identification of taxpayers and evaders and the collection of revenue 
as around U.S. $400 billion are held by Argentines in offshore as-
sets.16 Moreover, Argentina’s fiscal budget deficit during the first 
half of 2017 was 1.5% of its gross domestic product, which trans-
lates to about U.S. $8.4 billion.17 However, as a developing country 
with a past and present marked by ubiquitous government corrup-
tion and taxpayer distrust of keeping money within Argentina, the 
automatic exchange of information poses serious concerns about the 
                                                                                                             
 12 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 334; see also What is FATCA? What is CRS?, 
THOMSON REUTERS, https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/fatca-crs/what-is-crs-fatca/ 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
 13 Denise Hintzke & Andrea Garcia Castelao, The Common Reporting Stand-
ard: Impact on Financial Services Institutions, THE TAX ADVISOR (Mar. 1, 2016), 
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2016/mar/crs-impact-on-financial-ser-
vices-institutions.html. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See CRS by Jurisdiction, OECD (Oct. 18, 2017), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assis-
tance/crs-by-jurisdiction/; see also Argentina Signs Information-Sharing Agree-
ment With the U.S., THE TAX TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016, 7:24 AM), 
http://thetaxtimes.blogspot.com/2016/12/argentina-signs-information-shar-
ing.html. 
 16 Lucia He, Understanding Argentina’s New “Mega” Tax Amnesty Law, 
THE BUBBLE (July 11, 2016, 3:32 PM), http://www.thebubble.com/understand-
ing-argentinas-new-mega-tax-amnesty-law/. 
 17 Argentina Posts Fiscal Deficit of 1.5 Percent of GDP in First Half, 
REUTERS (July 19, 2017, 1:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-
fiscal/argentina-posts-fiscal-deficit-of-1-5-percent-of-gdp-in-first-half-
idUSKBN1A423E. 
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safety of confidential financial information.18 Long before the initial 
release of CRS, the OECD recognized the potential for misuse that 
access to such confidential information poses in the hands of corrupt 
tax administrators and other government officials.19 The OECD’s 
Keeping It Safe report acknowledges that some countries may not 
have the technological or bureaucratic infrastructure for such en-
hanced tax administration, and also, certain countries worry about 
the safety and security risks of automatically disclosing hundreds of 
thousands of accounts to corrupt governments.20 
The purpose of this article is to explore the current Argentine 
effort to participate in the automatic exchange of information as it 
relates to FATCA and the CRS, and its efforts to overcome current 
corruption, while protecting the confidentiality of taxpayer infor-
mation. In particular, this paper will pay attention to the impact cor-
ruption may have on effective tax administration and guidance for 
safeguarding the privacy and confidentiality of taxpayer infor-
mation. Part II of this article will discuss historical events that led to 
global concern with bank secrecy and tax evasion, how various 
agreements operate under FATCA and CRS, and Argentina’s agree-
ments to address tax evasion. Part III of this article will discuss rel-
evant instances of corruption in Argentina, the impact of corruption 
on tax administration, and the status of Argentina’s efforts to ad-
dress corruption. Part IV will discuss data confidentiality guidance 
from the OECD’s Keeping It Safe report and the IRS International 
Data Exchange Service (IDES) system, and explore the capacity for 
data privacy in tax administration in Argentina. Lastly, Part V will 
analyze Argentina’s ability to comply with the level of tax admin-
istration required under FATCA and CRS, and future implications 
                                                                                                             
 18 Cf. Patricia Rey Mallen, Mexico and Argentina Are the Most Corrupt 
Countries in Latin America, Survey Reveals, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 10, 2013, 
3:02 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/mexico-argentina-are-most-corrupt-coun-
tries-latin-america-survey-reveals-1340779 (discussing levels of corruption in 
Argentina’s public sector; therefore, there may be a connection between corrup-
tion and accountable tax administration that keeps financial information confiden-
tial). 
 19 See generally Keeping It Safe: The OECD Guide on the Protection of Con-
fidentiality of Information Exchanged for Tax Purposes, OECD (July 23, 2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/keeping-it-safe-report.pdf 
[hereinafter Keeping It Safe]. 
 20 Id. 
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that the international trend toward transparency may have on Argen-
tina. 
II. BANK SECRECY AND TAX EVASION 
A. Cracking the Vault: Tax Evasion Scandals and Commitments 
to End Bank Secrecy 
In 2008, major offshore tax evasion scandals gained interna-
tional publicity and negatively impacted some of the oldest banking 
institutions in Europe.21 Namely, the United Bank of Switzerland 
(UBS), one of Europe’s largest banks, aided in tax evasion.22 We-
gelin & Co., Switzerland’s oldest bank at 270 years old, also aided 
in tax evasion.23 Moreover, the Liechtenstein Global Trust (LGT) 
bank of the royal family of Liechtenstein implicated itself in a tax 
evasion scandal.24 
In response to disclosures of banks facilitating tax evasion, the 
U.S. indicted a UBS private banker, Bradley Birkenfeld, who “pled 
guilty to conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government based on his 
actions in helping wealthy U.S. citizens (living in the United States) 
conceal millions of dollars of income in UBS accounts.”25 Birken-
feld’s subsequent cooperation as a whistleblower with the U.S. gov-
ernment exposed actions taken by UBS to help its American clients 
evade taxes.26 Birkenfeld’s disclosures were highly instrumental in 
the Justice Department’s further investigations and UBS’s admis-
sion of guilt on charges of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. govern-
ment.27 
In exchange for this admission, UBS entered a deferred prose-
cution agreement pursuant to which UBS worked with the U.S. and 
Swiss governments to provide the IRS with thousands of accounts 
held by U.S. taxpayers.28 News of UBS’s investigation prompted 
Wegelin to spontaneously disclose undeclared accounts it held for 
                                                                                                             
 21 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 306. 
 22 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 306. 
 23 Kirsch, supra note 3, at 143. 
 24 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 306. 
 25 Kirsch, supra note 3, at 142. 
 26 Kirsch, supra note 3, at 142. 
 27 Kirsch, supra note 3, at 142. 
 28 Kirsch, supra note 3, at 142. 
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U.S. taxpayers.29 Eventually, Wegelin pled guilty to facilitating tax 
evasion and shut down after agreeing to pay “$74 million in restitu-
tion, fines, and forfeitures” to the U.S. government.30 U.S. enforce-
ment actions against tax evaders and offshore financial institutions 
facilitating tax evasion only increased following these scandals.31 
Internationally, leaders of the G20 countries also committed to in-
creasing transparency and exposing offshore tax evasion as the fi-
nancial crisis of 2008 magnified fiscal and budgetary problems.32 
The Panama Papers leak in 2015 can be considered a recent in-
dicator of where the world is on ending bank secrecy. Over eleven 
million files and 2.6 terabytes of information were leaked from the 
database of Mossack Fonseca, a leading Panamanian firm, revealing 
the use of offshore accounts by the wealthy around the world, in-
cluding some 143 politicians and 12 national leaders and their fam-
ilies or inner circle associates.33 Mossack Fonseca is the world’s 
fourth largest firm providing global offshore financial services in 
over 40 countries, but it mostly operates in countries considered as 
tax havens, such as Switzerland, Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands, 
and the British dependencies.34 Additionally, it has serviced over 
300,000 international companies.35 Regardless of whether Mossack 
Fonseca’s offshore services have been used for tax evasion or legit-
imate reasons, the use of confidential “tax havens” for the favorable 
tax treatment of investments is still popular. 
                                                                                                             
 29 Kirsch, supra note 3, at 143. 
 30 Kirsch, supra note 3, at 143. 
 31 Kirsch, supra note 3, at 146 (discussing that the U.S. has worked to combat 
bank secrecy since the enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970, which gave 
rise to the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) treasury 
form); Id. (noting that FBAR requires U.S. taxpayers holding foreign bank and 
financial accounts to report their aggregate balance in foreign accounts that ex-
ceed $10,000 at any time during the calendar year, and compliance with FBAR 
was traditionally low so Congress increased penalty amounts that are assessed for 
each year of noncompliance). 
 32 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 309 (noting that the G20 member states include 
the U.S., U.K., E.U., and many other states including Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
and China). 
 33 Luke Harding, What Are The Panama Papers? A Guide to History’s Big-
gest Data Leak, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2016, 5:42 PM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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B. A Comparative View of FATCA and CRS 
In 2010, Congress enacted FATCA as sections 1471 to 1474 of 
the Internal Revenue Code.36 It requires tax authorities in other ju-
risdictions, namely FFIs, to obtain detailed information on financial 
accounts held by U.S. citizens and foreign entities with significant 
U.S. ownership and to report that information back to the IRS.37 The 
particular financial information FATCA seeks to capture is the value 
of each account, the value of investment income, and the “gross pro-
ceeds from the sale of property credited to a U.S. account.”38 To 
ensure compliance by FFIs and Non-Financial Foreign Entities 
(NFFEs) that are implicated by the statute, FATCA contains a with-
holding tax provision, otherwise known as a penalty.39 Because FFIs 
may hold U.S. investments or receive U.S. sourced income, pay-
ments, or sales proceeds, amounts are withheld by imposing a 30% 
tax on all U.S. sourced income that these FFIs may receive if they 
do not comply with FATCA’s reporting and disclosure rules.40 Ul-
timately, Congress enacted FATCA to “force foreign financial insti-
tutions to disclose their U.S. account holders or pay a steep penalty 
for nondisclosure.”41 
While FATCA’s expectations are primarily unilateral in that it 
demands that information be reported to the IRS without reciprocity, 
the OECD envisioned a multilateral mechanism for sharing tax in-
formation of residents globally.42 The OECD released the first ver-
sion of the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account 
Information in Tax Matters in 2014, which contained the CRS and 
model “competent authority” agreements (MCAAs) which could be 
                                                                                                             
 36 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 334. 
 37 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 335; see also What is FATCA? What is CRS?, 
supra note 12. 
 38 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 334. 
 39 What is FATCA? What is CRS?, supra note 12. 
 40 Ikins D. Clarke, U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA): 
FATCA And The Banking Sector, DELOITTE (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.carib-
export.com/login/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/FATCA-and-the-Banking-
Sector-Ikins-Clarke.pdf. 
 41 Grinberg, supra note 2, at 334. 
 42 See Kirsch, supra note 3, at 119 (noting that the U.S. uses either citizenship 
or residence as a basis to assert jurisdiction for taxation over an individual, while 
the overwhelming majority of other countries use residence as a basis to assert tax 
jurisdiction). 
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entered into on a bilateral, multilateral, or nonreciprocal basis by 
participating countries.43 More specifically, the CRS is an extensive 
reporting standard, broader in scope than FATCA, and provides 
rules on documentation and due diligence applicable to financial in-
stitutions.44 In scope, CRS is broader in terms of the kind of financial 
information it seeks to collect, applies broadly to residents of any 
given participating country and not solely citizens, and applies to 
more categories of reporting entities than does FATCA.45 As of De-
cember 2015, over 95 jurisdictions committed to the CRS, excluding 
the U.S.46 
C. Agreements Under FATCA and Argentina’s Commitment 
The U.S. has facilitated the implementation of FATCA through 
the use of bilateral Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs).47 IGAs 
are not tax treaties, but rather are negotiated agreements with partner 
jurisdictions that are treated as “in effect” or “in force” by the IRS 
and the partner jurisdiction.48 IGAs are meant to overcome re-
strictions or conflict with local laws in partner jurisdictions.49 FFIs 
in these partner jurisdictions that have agreed to an IGA can choose 
to follow the IGA agreement in effect, or an FFI can choose not to 
follow the IGA.50 The IRS considers FFIs that do not follow IGAs 
to be nonparticipating financial institutions subject to a withholding 
penalty.51 There are two model IGAs that jurisdictions can have with 
the U.S., either the Model 1 IGA, providing for the reciprocal ex-
                                                                                                             
 43 Hintzke & Castelao, supra note 13. 
 44 Hintzke & Castelao, supra note 13. (noting that CRS is based extensively 
on FATCA Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreements (Model 1 IGA)). 
 45 Hintzke & Castelao, supra note 13. 
 46 Hintzke & Castelao, supra note 13. 
 47 ERIKA K. LUNDER & CAROL A. PETTIT, CONG. RES. SERV., R43444, 
REPORTING FOREIGN FINANCIAL ASSETS UNDER TITLES 26 AND 31: FATCA AND 
FBAR 1, 8 (2014) [hereinafter FATCA and FBAR]. 
 48 U.S. IRS is Focusing on FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements Currently 
“In Effect”, ERNST & YOUNG (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.ey.com/gl/en/ser-
vices/tax/international-tax/alert--us-irs-is-focusing-on-fatca-intergovernmental-
agreements-currently--in-effect-. 
 49 Id. 
 50 FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9. 
 51 FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9. 
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change of information, or the Model 2 IGA with no reciprocal ex-
change provision.52 Depending on whether the jurisdiction already 
has a tax treaty or tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) with 
the U.S., the IGA may derive authority from the legal framework 
already in place between the two governments.53 Furthermore, pur-
suant to Model 1 IGAs, FFIs report to their jurisdiction’s tax author-
ity or administration, and then the tax authority reports the infor-
mation on an annual basis to the IRS.54 Conversely, pursuant to 
Model 2 IGAs where there is no treaty or agreement with the juris-
diction, FFIs report, pursuant to an FFI agreement and with the con-
sent of the account holder, directly to the IRS.55 If an FFI does not 
have the consent of the account holder, then the FFI reports account 
information in the aggregate directly to the IRS, giving the IRS the 
option to request information about that group from the jurisdic-
tion.56 As of 2016, 83 IGAs have been signed but only 61 are con-
sidered in force.57 
Currently, Argentina has signed a TIEA with the U.S., and the 
two governments are negotiating a more comprehensive tax treaty.58 
The U.S.’s desire for countries to enter into IGAs has largely expe-
dited the negotiations it has had with Argentina in the past.59 The 
U.S. had desired a bilateral tax treaty with Argentina to negotiate 
double taxation provisions as they pertain to multinational compa-
nies; whereas, Argentina preferred a TIEA to maintain some of its 
taxing rights over multinational companies with connections to the 
U.S.60 
Increased collaboration between the U.S. and Argentina benefits 
both countries: the TIEA benefits the U.S. by inducing Argentina to 
                                                                                                             
 52 FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9. 
 53 FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9. 
 54 FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9. 
 55 FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9. 
 56 FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9. 
 57 FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9. 
 58 Argentina Signs Information-Sharing Agreement With the U.S., supra note 
15. 
 59 See Martin Hearson, Why the U.S. and Argentina Have No Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement, WORDPRESS (Sept. 5, 2013), https://martinhearson.word-
press.com/2013/09/05/why-the-us-and-argentina-have-no-tax-information-ex-
change-agreement/. 
 60 Id. 
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sign an IGA to comply with FATCA, and it benefits Argentina, 
which suffered economically prior to the current Macri administra-
tion.61 The agreement will enable Argentina to identify undeclared 
taxpayer accounts in the U.S. and lends credibility to the Macri ad-
ministration’s governance. Argentina has also implemented its own 
tax amnesty plan to induce voluntary compliance among its taxpay-
ers.62 
D. Multilateral Competent Authority Agreements (MCAA) 
Under CRS and Argentina’s Commitment 
CRS is very broad because it capitalizes off of existing frame-
works for the automatic exchange of tax information developed al-
ready between countries, by the OECD and the E.U., such as frame-
works like Article 6 of the Multilateral Convention, extant bilateral 
tax treaties or TIEAs, and the E.U. Directive.63 As a result, CRS is 
readily translated into domestic law, increasing the chance of suc-
cessful implementation of CRS and MCAA’s due diligence require-
ments to identify reportable accounts in a jurisdiction.64 Moreover, 
CRS requires jurisdictions to report intended exchange partners, 
confirm that domestic CRS legislation is in place, report whether the 
basis of its exchange is reciprocal or nonreciprocal, report data 
transmission and encryption methods to be used, report data protec-
tion requirements not yet achieved, and confirm that domestic data 
privacy and confidentiality safeguards are in line with CRS.65 While 
CRS is already extensive, each jurisdiction that participates in CRS 
can choose to structure its domestic law to capture more information 
                                                                                                             
 61 Argentina Signs Information-Sharing Agreement With the U.S., supra note 
15. 
 62 Argentina Signs Information-Sharing Agreement With the U.S., supra note 
15. 
 63 International Framework For The CRS, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-
crs/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) (noting that the Multilateral Convention is also 
known as the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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and increase efficiency within their automatic exchange of infor-
mation framework.66 
Currently, Argentina has indicated its intent to comply with CRS 
and begin reporting by the beginning of 2017.67Argentina has shown 
support for information sharing and tax transparency since 2012, 
when it became the first country in South America to become a party 
to the OECD’s Multilateral Convention.68 Joining the Multilateral 
Convention gave Argentina additional tools for international tax co-
operation and administrative assistance in tax matters.69 
III. CORRUPTION IN ARGENTINA 
A. A History of Economic Boom and Decline 
In the earlier part of the 20th century, Argentina’s economic 
growth and urbanization outpaced other countries in Latin Amer-
ica.70 Argentina experienced a golden age, prior to World War I, 
where its gross domestic product (GDP) steadily grew by 6% annu-
ally due to its agriculture and cattle industries, and the country ex-
perienced a large wave of immigration from Europe.71 Argentina 
was even ranked as one of the ten richest countries in the world at 
that time in league with the U.S., Great Britain, and other western 
countries, such as France.72 By the 1930s, many Argentine cities 
were urbanized while other countries in Latin America remained 
predominantly rural.73 That legacy is evident today in metropolitan 
                                                                                                             
 66 Argentina: GATCA And CRS Compliance (OECD), GOLDING & GOLDING, 
https://www.goldinglawyers.com/argentina-gatca-and-crs-compliance-oecd-in-
ternational-tax-lawyers/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Argentina Becomes the First South American Country to Become a Party 
to the Multilateral Convention, OECD (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/taxargentinabecomes-
thefirstsouthamericancountrytobecomeapartytothemultilateralconvention.htm. 
 69 Id. 
 70 ELISA MUZZINI ET AL., LEVERAGING THE POTENTIAL OF ARGENTINE 
CITIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY ACTION 7 (World Bank Group eds., 2017). 
 71 The Tragedy of Argentina: A Century of Decline, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 
17, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21596582-one-hundred-
years-ago-argentina-was-future-what-went-wrong-century-decline. 
 72 Id. 
 73 MUZZINI ET AL., supra note 70, at 7. 
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Buenos Aires alone, which accounts for almost 50% of Argentina’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) and a little less than 40% of the coun-
try’s urban population.74 
Although Argentina may have outpaced other countries in the 
region in the early 20th century, its economic growth has been 
dampened by political unrest and cycles of financial crises starting 
with a military coup in 1930.75 Additional military coups followed 
in 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976.76 Argentina’s history of mili-
tary dictatorship ended in 1989 when it held popular elections for 
the first time in decades.77 As Argentina experienced constant polit-
ical change, it also experienced instability in its economy, even dur-
ing the period when democracy had been restored.78 Argentina ex-
perienced repeated recessions throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, 
and during the two-year period between 1989 and 1990, hyperinfla-
tion further destabilized the economy.79 Inflation rose over 2,000% 
and peaked at 20,000%.80 
Then in 1998, Argentina experienced a deep recession and cata-
strophic financial crisis that lasted until 2002.81 The government’s 
fiscal policies at that time, including extensive foreign borrowing, 
contributed to further devaluation and distrust of the peso and even-
tually led to a run on the banks in November 2001.82 The govern-
ment took austerity measures, such as freezing bank deposits and 
access to savings accounts to prevent accountholders from convert-
ing Argentine pesos into U.S. dollars under the existing Converti-
bility Plan, which had provided that pesos could be exchanged on a 
1:1 basis with the U.S. dollar.83 Unable to convert pesos into dollars, 
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Argentines could not protect against losing their savings to high in-
flation.84 Civil unrest ensued in December 2001 as Argentines 
demonstrated against these fiscal measures.85 
A few days later, after the government froze personal bank ac-
counts, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced it could 
no longer loan money to Argentina because Argentina repeatedly 
failed to meet the conditions of its September 2001 rescue pro-
gram.86 The IMF had given Argentina over US $20 billion in support 
between 2000 and 2001.87 Without international financial support 
from the IMF, Argentina effectively lost access to international fi-
nancial markets and defaulted on its US $93 billion sovereign debt.88 
Due to this financial crisis, the Argentine economy suffered between 
2001 and 2002: the economy contracted by 11%; unemployment 
rose to 22.5%; and 57.5% of Argentines were considered as living 
below the national poverty line.89 The austere fiscal measures taken, 
like the Law of Public Emergency and Reform of the Exchange Rate 
Regime which unpegged the peso from the U.S. dollar, and negoti-
ations to restructure its debt, slowly brought Argentina out of its fi-
nancial crisis by the end of 2002.90 However, it took until 2010 to 
restructure over 90% of Argentina’s defaulted debt.91 Moreover, 
lasting damage to the value of the peso and the Argentine banking 
sector further cemented public distrust of Argentine currency and 
Argentine institutions.92 
B. Popular Distrust and Ubiquitous Corruption 
The lack of confidence and distrust in Argentina’s political and 
financial institutions could not be more evident in the illegal ex-
change market known as a cueva, or “cave,” used by Argentines who 
favor holding onto U.S. dollars, rather than pesos.93 Cuevas thrived 
between 2010 and 2015 when Argentina had an official exchange 
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rate that made it unfavorable for Argentines to exchange their pesos 
for dollars.94 Argentines and travelers preferred the going market 
exchange rate because it offered more pesos per dollar than the of-
ficial exchange rate.95 This situation led to the black market for 
dólar blue, or “blue dollar,” and cueva storefronts to complete the 
black market transactions.96 Although the Argentine government ad-
dressed this problem in December 2015 by getting rid of the official 
exchange rate in favor of the floating market exchange rate, the 
black market for dollars still exists.97 Argentines are mainly trying 
to hedge against the uncertainty of inflation which affects the afford-
ability of a basic food basket: “Imagine a dollar burning a hole in 
your pocket because you don’t know if it will be worth 60 or 30 
cents in a few months.”98 
It may not be surprising that Argentina’s history of political tur-
moil, economic instability, and distrust of the peso and legitimate 
banking institutions have contributed to Argentina’s standing as a 
corrupt nation.99 According to a 2013 global corruption survey by 
Transparency International, an international nongovernmental or-
ganization (NGO), Argentines believe, on average, that political 
parties, public officials, civil servants, police, the judiciary, and the 
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legislature are more corrupt than the business sector.100 Addition-
ally, 72% of Argentines believed that their country’s corruption had 
increased between 2013 and 2014.101 
Whereas abuse of police power was considered the most ram-
pant in countries like Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia, and El Salvador, 
political corruption was considered the most rampant by residents in 
Argentina, similar to the public opinion of residents in Brazil, Co-
lombia, and Uruguay about political corruption.102 In 2000, Harvard 
University and the World Economic Forum did a Global Competi-
tiveness Report of 4,022 firms in 59 countries, and Argentina also 
scored poorly then: 54th in the independence of the judiciary; 45th 
for corruption in the legal system; 40th for irregular payments to 
government officials; and 54th in the reliability of police protec-
tion.103 
Political corruption in Argentina has even extended to the office 
of the president. For example, in the 1990s, former President Carlos 
Menem was known for packing a Supreme Court with his political 
supporters even though he did not align with them politically.104 Af-
ter his presidency, Menem was arrested and charged with an illegal 
arms-shipment deal.105 In 2016, former President Cristina Fernán-
dez de Kirchner was charged with corruption during her time in of-
fice from 2007 to 2015.106 Fernández de Kirchner was indicted for 
directing government contracts for public road works to a company 
called Austral Constructions.107 Fernández de Kirchner’s former 
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Minister of Planning, Julio De Vido, and her former Secretary of 
Public Works, José Lopez were also charged.108 Fernández de 
Kirchner was also separately indicted for interfering with the sale of 
U.S. dollars by Argentina’s central bank by selling U.S. $17 billion 
in futures contracts at 10.65 pesos to the dollar, which was much 
lower than the true value of the peso per dollar in the futures market 
at that time.109 She was indicted along with her former Finance Min-
ister and the former Central Bank Chief.110 Lastly, Fernández de 
Kirchner was indicted for allegedly receiving kickbacks from an-
other construction company to which she may have directed govern-
ment contracts.111 
The election of the current president, Mauricio Macri, a pro-
business and fiscal conservative, is considered a shift away from the 
liberal policies of Fernández de Kirchner and her deceased husband 
who preceded her as president.112 Whereas Fernández de Kirchner’s 
policies focused on extensive social spending to help poor families, 
human rights issues, and economic policies that were considered 
anti-business, Macri’s administration promises to de-regulate the 
economy and allow the market to prevail in order to address the 
stagnant economy and reduce inflation.113 A 2017 Multi-Dimen-
sional Economic Survey of Argentina by the OECD shows that there 
are currently higher barriers to entrepreneurship and competition in 
Argentina than Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and, on average, 
Latin America in its entirety.114 
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C. The Nexus Between Corruption and Tax Administration 
Corruption can be defined as the “pecuniary or nonpecuniary 
considerations given to government officials for the use of public 
office for private gains.”115 Corruption can further be classified into 
five general categories: political, administrative, grand corruption, 
petty corruption, and patronage or paternalism.116 For example, 
when corruption is systemic and political, it can affect the design 
and implementation stages of government policies and even skew 
regulatory decisions.117 On the other hand, corruption can be local-
ized or petty on the bureaucratic level and involve activities such as 
bribery or interference with the routine allocation of zoning rights 
and licenses.118 Other common examples of corruption are govern-
ment construction projects and how such contracts are awarded or 
renegotiated.119 Generally, corruption may initiate either on the sup-
ply side, where a bribe is offered, or the demand side, where a bribe 
is requested.120 
While Latin America includes emerging markets that have ex-
perienced improvements in corruption, most improvements are 
small.121 For example, corruption in Honduras has improved with 
efforts to control corruption in critical institutions, such as the police 
force, the social security administration, and the tax administra-
tion.122 Nevertheless, corruption in Honduras remains above the av-
erage of normalized corruption in Latin America.123 Like Honduras, 
Argentina’s level of corruption also remains above the average of 
normalized corruption in the region.124 
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Because endemic corruption has been known to affect the state’s 
ability to perform its core functions, it may also negatively affect tax 
administration.125 Several variables that contribute to corruption in 
tax administration include: (1) the complexity of tax laws, (2) the 
monopoly power and degree of discretion of tax officials, (3) the 
lack of adequate monitoring and supervision, (4) political leader-
ship, (5) the unwillingness of taxpayers to pay taxes, and (6) the en-
vironment in the public sector.126 With regard to the complexity of 
tax laws, as a system becomes more complex, taxpayers are less 
likely to be aware of their rights and procedural rules applicable to 
them, giving tax officers more discretion in their treatment of tax-
payers.127 This dynamic may increase the risk of exploitation of tax-
payers by tax officials.128 With regard to the monopoly power and 
discretion of tax officials, the tax officers operating within their as-
signed regions or geographical area represent the tax department, 
and the monopoly power this gives a tax official increases the po-
tential for corruption by both the taxpayer and the tax officer.129 
However, it is important to note that the complexity of tax laws and 
procedures in itself does not always lead to corruption, but rather is 
closely connected to another variable, the overall environment in the 
public sector.130 The level of corruption in the administrative envi-
ronment of the government as a whole will influence the level of 
corruption in that government’s tax administration.131 
Socialist systems offer greater opportunities for corruption than 
do liberal economic systems because of the greater administrative 
controls over the economy that give bureaucrats greater discretion 
in economic planning and implementation.132 The complexity of tax 
laws, the overall environment of corruption in government, and the 
power of bureaucrats within a heavily regulated economy are 
closely intertwined and all often lead to a lack of monitoring and 
supervision.133 Without adequate supervision, accountability, and 
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enforcement measures to maintain integrity, public workers are 
more likely to shirk their public duties.134 Political leadership may 
also insulate corrupt practices, and when this happens, the spread of 
corruption at lower levels is likely.135 From macro-level fiscal in-
centives to foreign trade taxes, high-level officials and politicians 
are more likely to be involved and also implicate lower-level offi-
cials who share in the gains from the illegal activity.136 
As aforementioned, Argentina has high levels of corruption at 
the political level, and almost two-thirds of Argentines believe that 
the political leadership, the legislature, and the judiciary are cor-
rupt.137 Coupled with a popular distrust of the peso, the formal bank-
ing institutions, and the black market for dollars, it can be inferred 
that Argentina’s level of corruption even affects its tax administra-
tion.138 Another variable, when determining corruption in tax ad-
ministration, is the unwillingness of taxpayers to pay taxes.139 The 
unwillingness to pay taxes is particularly common in middle-income 
countries, such as India.140 Taxpayers who are extremely unwilling 
to pay taxes or comply with the law are more likely to proactively 
offer bribes to tax officials in order to not pay taxes at all or reduce 
their tax liability.141 Like India, Argentina experiences high tax eva-
sion; as of 2016, Argentines have held between $200 billion and 
$400 billion in assets in offshore accounts in countries like Switzer-
land, the United States, and Uruguay.142 During the presidency of 
Fernández de Kirchner, Argentines hid their wealth offshore be-
cause of the extremely high inflation and unreliable economic data 
published by the administration.143 
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D. The Status of Argentina’s Domestic and International Efforts 
to Address the Economy and Corruption 
Current domestic policy in Argentina may have the effect of 
lowering corruption while improving the economy. One of President 
Macri’s goals for his administration after taking office in December 
2015 was to address Argentina’s economic problems, including high 
inflation and tax evasion.144 With Macri’s support, the Argentine 
Senate approved a tax amnesty law in 2016.145 The tax amnesty law 
is entitled Ley de Sinceramiento Fiscal y Reparación Histórica a los 
Jubilados (the Fiscal Honesty and Historic Reparation to Pensioners 
Law), and is nicknamed ley de blanqueos.146 The ley de blanqueos 
is a multipurpose bill designed to incentivize compliance with Ar-
gentine tax law, bring back billions of dollars into the formal and 
legitimate economy, and restore the pecuniary interests of unpaid 
pensioners.147 
First, the ley de blanqueos allows Argentines to register unde-
clared income and assets without questioning their origins and re-
moves the threat of prosecution for tax evasion.148 Individuals and 
companies can declare their assets in three ways: paying a zero, five, 
or ten percent tax rate on declared assets depending on the total 
amount declared; purchase non-transferable Argentine Treasury 
bonds; or “invest in the economy through a Common Fund for long-
term investments” in public works.149 If assets are not declared, then 
individuals or companies risk prosecution for tax evasion.150 The ley 
de blanqueos excludes all members of the Executive, Legislative, 
and Judicial branches, and their immediate family, from participat-
ing in the tax amnesty program because of opposition party concerns 
that the law would benefit government officials who evade taxes.151 
The government expects US $20 billion to come into the country 
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through the ley de blanqueos because of tax revenues, assets volun-
tarily brought back from overseas, and its investment schemes.152 
The Macri administration also expects the CRS and Argentina’s 
multinational agreements on the exchange of information to make it 
easier to detect taxpayers hiding money abroad.153 
Second, the ley de blanqueos will allow for new money to be 
used as reparations to pensioners and retirees who never received 
their pension payment, or a small fraction of their payments, over 
the past twenty years due to government fraud.154 
As the ley de blanqueos strengthens the integrity of the Argen-
tine government through policies that promote Argentines partici-
pating legitimately in the formal economy, it may have the desired 
effect of lowering levels of corruption in Argentine government and 
society. Within five to six months of the enactment of the ley de 
blanqueos, Argentines declared US $90 billion,155 beating both the 
government’s modest estimates and the $2.6 billion declared under 
tax amnesty during the Fernández de Kirchner administration.156 
However, despite the initial success of the ley de blanqueos, the 
OECD’s 2017 economic survey of Argentina found several key ob-
stacles still affecting Argentina: (1) the rule of law is still weak and 
corruption hinders the investment climate; (2) the central bank lacks 
a level of independence which reduces the effectiveness of monetary 
policy; (3) the tax system is complex, fails to reduce inequalities, 
and encourages people to turn to the informal economy; (4) few peo-
ple pay income taxes; and (5) multi-year deficit targets by the exec-
utive branch are not mirrored in legislation and rules.157 The OECD 
expresses hope in the pro-market economic reforms that President 
Macri’s administration has made and provides recommendations on 
domestic policy that will help Argentina to raise the material living 
standard, bolster the social safety net, and close the high income-
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inequality gap that leaves one-third of all Argentines in poverty.158 
With respect to corruption, the OECD recommends that Argentina 
strengthen the independence of entities that investigate corruption, 
reorganize the judiciary, and enact the Corporate Liability Bill to 
provide for the prosecution of corporate bribery.159 
Aside from domestic policy, Argentina has made international 
commitments to lower corruption. As of March 24, 2017, Argentina 
has been part of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention for the past 
sixteen years.160 While Argentina has made efforts to implement the 
Convention on Combating Bribery since December 2015, the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery found that Argentina still re-
mains in serious non-compliance.161 Regarding recommendations 
from its Phase 3 evaluation, Argentina has only fully implemented 
Recommendations 8, 11(a), and 12(a), and partially implemented 
4(e), 5(a), 5(d), 5(f), 6(a), 6(b), 9(c), 9(d), 10(c), 10(d), 10(f), 11(b), 
12(b), and 13(a).162 About 24 other recommendations remain out-
standing.163 Of these recommendations, 11(a) is a tax-related meas-
ure that would disallow the tax deductibility of bribes to foreign 
public officials, 11(b) would increase training for tax examiners and 
official tax administrators on detecting bribery, and 11(c) calls for 
amending legislation to allow tax information to be shared with for-
eign authorities for use in bribery investigations.164 Moreover, the 
OECD is concerned that Argentina has not enacted the Corporate 
Liability Bill introduced into Congress in 2016, which would hold 
companies and citizens liable for foreign bribery.165 Also, the Crim-
inal Procedure Code of 2014 has not been entered into force, which 
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would aid in the speedy investigation and prosecution of complex 
economic crimes.166 Lastly, Argentina has not introduced legislation 
to protect whistleblowers.167 
IV. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY 
A. Fears that Less Bank Secrecy Could Threaten the Personal 
Safety of the Taxpayers 
Before the automatic and voluntary exchange of tax information 
became as popular as it is today, some jurisdictions feared the neg-
ative consequences of sharing sensitive taxpayer information with 
developing countries.168 These jurisdictions were primarily consid-
ered tax havens, which favored bank secrecy.169 The general prob-
lem was that these jurisdictions lacked confidence in the tax admin-
istrations of developing countries to safeguard confidential financial 
information, and they feared that leaks inside the domestic tax sys-
tem would be likely, leading to formal and informal harassment of 
people or companies.170 Wealthy taxpayers primarily feared that 
leakage of their financial information could lead to “extortion, con-
fiscation of their wealth, overtaxing, kidnapping, erosion of their 
civil liberties,” and other forms of harassment.171 For example, some 
taxpayers even feared that the exchange of tax information could 
compromise the privacy and safety of certain marginalized groups 
in the Middle East, such as gay individuals in Saudi Arabia or Jews 
in other jurisdictions.172 Moreover, for wealthy taxpayers in Latin 
America, the growth of gang violence and organized crime presents 
an ongoing threat to their personal security.173 
While these potential fears about the exchange of tax infor-
mation may be well grounded, there are competing perspectives on 
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the likelihood of taxpayer information being used for other illicit 
purposes. For example, the perspective of Nicholas Shaxson and the 
Tax Justice Network, a self-described pro-globalization activist 
think tank,174 is that these fears are unfounded. Shaxson argues that 
a secret bank account will not protect a Latin American landowner 
or South East Asian executive from kidnapping or extortion because 
criminals or gangs act without needing to know about secret wealth 
holdings.175 Primarily, criminals act based on knowledge of one’s 
domestic and visible wealth or holdings.176 And rich families who 
fear kidnapping and extortion will have already procured security or 
moved because they can afford it.177 Shaxson further argues that 
wealth confiscation is a weak argument because the exchange of tax 
information does not mean that wealth and investments have to be 
returned into the country.178 Rather, it means that gross income is 
known so that the appropriate tax can be assessed.179 
On the other hand, the Center for Freedom and Prosperity shares 
a completely opposite view. The Center is a non-profit organization 
that advances international market liberalization, financial privacy, 
and the fiscal sovereignty of jurisdictions to preserve jurisdictional 
tax competition.180 According to the Center, FATCA and the CRS 
will substantially threaten the financial privacy of taxpayers and 
lead to abuse, giving credibility to the fears mentioned above.181 The 
concern for abuse stems from the Center’s view that it is imprudent 
to share sensitive financial information about American citizens or 
corporations with countries that “do not respect Western privacy 
norms, have systematic problems with corruption or are antagonistic 
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to the United States.”182 The Center says that countries such as Co-
lombia, China, and Russia present this problem.183 
Although the U.S. Treasury Department and the IRS review the 
data privacy legal framework of the foreign jurisdiction before en-
tering into an information exchange agreement under FATCA, it 
does not dissuade foreign tax administrators from having other mo-
tives.184 The Center says this is because the underlying institutional 
interest of tax agencies is the collection of tax revenue, and there is 
little incentive to think beyond that interest.185 Additionally, tax ad-
ministrators in corrupt governments with access to the personal fi-
nancial information of American expatriates may use the infor-
mation for criminal purposes like committing identity theft, identi-
fying potential kidnapping victims, identifying the resources of po-
tential political opponents or dissenters, or committing industrial es-
pionage.186 
A third perspective lying outside, the binary debate between tax 
transparency versus data protection may be evidenced in the actual 
experience of tax administration in developing countries, such as 
Mexico. At one point in time, taxpayers were able to pay taxes with 
in-kind contributions or even pay taxes anonymously.187 For exam-
ple, the art-for-taxes program, which was created in 1957, allowed 
noncompliant taxpayers who owed back taxes to pay off tax debt 
with paintings, sculptures, and other art instead of cash.188 Based on 
Aztec and Mayan traditions of paying tax debt with in-kind goods 
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or services, the art-for-taxes program has had the effect of promot-
ing art and giving Mexico a rich art collection of museum quality 
works displayed in museums throughout the country.189 
With respect to the anonymous payment of taxes, under the 
Third Article of the Tax Decree of January 26, 2005, tax residents 
in Mexico with foreign source income may elect to pay income taxes 
on an anonymous basis.190 The resident taxpayer will receive pay-
ment verification to keep in their records in the event of a future 
audit, but their identity remains undisclosed.191 These alternate 
methods of tax collection in Mexico show that despite its high levels 
of corruption and kidnappings,192 plenty of taxpayers, even those 
with money offshore, are not evading taxation and may pay taxes 
without disclosure. 
Overall, arguments against the exchange of tax information may 
hold some weight, but the general consensus after the economic cri-
sis of 2008 and 2009 was that ensuring tax compliance promotes 
better governance.193 An argument for the exchange of tax infor-
mation was that because political leaders in developing countries 
were likely to either falsify domestic tax returns or use offshore bank 
accounts to safeguard their wealth against inflation or evade taxes, 
equal treatment of rich and poor taxpayers would cause domestic tax 
systems to improve.194 The impetus for improvement would come 
from the elites, subject to equal treatment, who are influential 
enough to advocate for better governance and accountability.195 
Generally, the OECD has led the consensus that transparency 
and the effective exchange of information would lead to improved 
governance and that tax havens which facilitate tax avoidance and 
criminal activity like money laundering and embezzlement destabi-
lize the global economy.196 To this end, the OECD has published 
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comprehensive guidance in the aforementioned Keeping It Safe re-
port for jurisdictions desiring to share information, while improving 
their governance and taxpayer confidence in the integrity of domes-
tic tax administration. 
B. OECD and American Guidance on Data Confidentiality in 
Tax Administration 
In 2012, the OECD published Keeping It Safe as guidance to 
jurisdictions on protecting the confidentiality of tax information ex-
changed under various exchange of information agreements and 
treaties.197 Anticipating the growth of tax information exchange 
globally, the OECD’s report underscores the importance of taxpayer 
confidence in the confidentiality of their information exchanged un-
der such agreements and treaties.198 Therefore, keeping tax infor-
mation confidential requires not only a legal framework made of 
legislation, rules, and procedures, but also a “culture of care” within 
a tax administration.199 Promoting a culture of care involves enforc-
ing security, ethics, and proper handling and disposal of infor-
mation.200 The desired outcome is that a taxpayer’s sensitive finan-
cial information is not accidentally or intentionally disclosed inap-
propriately and that the information is used only for the purposes 
permitted under the exchange of information treaty or agreement.201 
The OECD has created three model confidentiality provisions 
for each exchange of information (EOI) instruments a country may 
enter into with another country.202 The various EOIs that a country 
may enter into with another may include tax treaties, tax information 
exchange agreements (TIEAs), or multilateral instruments on mu-
tual administrative assistance in tax matters.203 The three corre-
sponding OECD models include: (1) the Model Tax Convention, (2) 
the Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters 
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(TIEA), and (3) the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administra-
tive Assistance in Tax Matters.204 In pertinent part, Article 26(2) of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention provides: 
Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting 
State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information 
obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed 
only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative 
bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforce-
ment or prosecution in respect of, the determination of appeals in 
relation to the taxes referred to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of 
the above. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only 
for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court 
proceedings or in judicial decisions.205 
Article 26(2) is relevant to data confidentiality because it states 
that information received pursuant to a tax treaty shall be treated as 
secret to the same extent as information obtained domestically 
would in the recipient State.206 Additionally, Article 26(2) limits the 
disclosure of information to the appropriate persons or authorities, 
including the taxpayer, his proxy or witness, the courts, and admin-
istrative and oversight bodies.207 The information is disclosed only 
to the persons or authorities necessarily involved in the assessment, 
collection, enforcement, prosecution, or determination of appeals 
with which the tax information is related.208 
The confidentiality provisions under Article 8 of the Model 
Agreement (TIEA) and Article 22 of the Multilateral Convention are 
both similar to Article 26(2) of the Model Convention because they 
require that the information be kept secret, restrict the entities that 
can access the information, and limit the purposes for which the in-
formation can be used.209 The Model Agreement (TIEA) slightly 
differs from the Model Tax Convention in that the TIEA does not 
provide for keeping information secret in the same manner as the 
recipient state would, and it “permits disclosure to any other person, 
entity, authority or jurisdiction provided express written consent is 
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given by the competent authority of the requested party.”210 Like the 
Model Agreement (TIEA), the Multilateral Convention also permits 
the information to be used for other purposes as long as the re-
quested party authorizes such use.211 The Multilateral Convention 
differs from the other two because it specifically requires the recip-
ient state to protect the personal data received in a manner consistent 
with the data protection laws of the supplying State.212 Conse-
quently, no matter which instrument negotiating countries may use 
to establish the exchange of tax information, the OECD models set 
a baseline for expectations regarding data confidentiality and pro-
tection.213 
In addition to legal frameworks setting expectations for the pro-
tection of data exchanged internationally, the OECD’s report em-
phasizes the importance of tax confidentiality provisions in domes-
tic legislation.214 The OECD’s guidance that domestic laws be im-
plemented to protect and enforce the confidentiality of tax infor-
mation and reflect the binding nature of treaty obligations supports 
the proposition that the exchange of information as a solution to tax 
evasion promotes better domestic governance.215 The OECD ad-
vises that domestic laws pertaining to data protection, privacy, and 
the freedom of information are synchronized with, or provide ex-
emptions for, exchange of information treaties or agreements.216 
With respect to actual tax administration, policies and practices 
should be comprehensive and address the following: employee 
screening and background checks; employment contracts and em-
ployee training; accessibility to premises, and electronic and physi-
cal records; encryption and transferal; departure policies; infor-
mation disposal policies; and managing unauthorized disclosures of 
information and sanctions.217 Administrative policies and practices 
“need to be reviewed and endorsed at the top level of tax administra-
tion,” and roles for implementing policy and procedure should be 
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clearly defined.218 Lastly, promoting a culture of care requires reg-
ularly monitoring compliance.219 
It is important to note a criticism of the OECD models, particu-
larly the Model Agreement. One contention is that the Model Agree-
ment only covers the exchange of information upon request and not 
the automatic or spontaneous exchange of information.220 For ex-
ample, when information is requested, it must relate to a particular 
inquiry regarding a known taxpayer.221 For instance, the Bahamas-
U.S. TIEA requires a written request that specifically states the type 
of information requested, the likely location of that information, the 
relevant period of time, the applicable U.S. law, an indication of 
whether the matter is criminal or civil, and reasons why the re-
quested information is foreseeably relevant.222 Therefore, exchang-
ing information upon request would require the requesting state to 
at least know that the individual is evading taxes and to initiate its 
own investigation.223 The chances of a state knowing whether an in-
dividual has evaded taxes in the first place is remote because of the 
bank secrecy and data protection laws in other jurisdictions, includ-
ing tax havens.224 
On the other hand, the automatic exchange of information is 
broader in scope and requires taxpayer information about various 
categories of income to be spontaneously and periodically transmit-
ted in bulk from the source country to the resident country.225 The 
resident country need not put in any effort to ascertain non-compli-
ant taxpayers beyond the infrastructure it has created for receiving 
the exchanged information.226 Despite this criticism, the voluntary 
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exchange of information, as opposed to automatic exchange, may 
recognize the integrity of personal data and serve as a compromise 
between two priorities: transparency in international tax and data 
privacy. This may be because the exchange of information upon re-
quest still allows countries to go after tax evaders beyond its borders, 
while the legal framework establishing the exchange prevents the 
dragnet disclosure of personal financial information without a ra-
tional basis to tax administration.227 Personal financial information 
will only be disclosed once the requesting state has done its due dil-
igence.228 
While the U.S. has not published guidance to a similar degree as 
the OECD, it supports the automatic exchange of information 
through FATCA.229 FATCA has been criticized by FFIs and foreign 
jurisdictions that have argued complying with FATCA’s automatic 
exchange scheme violates their domestic privacy and data protection 
laws.230 Coupled with the withholding penalty for noncompliance, 
some jurisdictions and FFIs feel that they must comply.231 Moreo-
ver, while IGAs between the U.S. Treasury Department and foreign 
jurisdictions may provide a legal framework establishing the auto-
matic exchange of information, IGAs, and treaties alike, require for-
eign jurisdictions to alter their own domestic laws to incorporate 
terms of the agreement or treaty.232 
Nevertheless, the U.S. does provide for the secure transmission 
of automatically exchanged information with the IDES.233 The 
IDES is an electronic, internet-based delivery point that FFIs and 
Host Country Tax Authorities (HCTA) can use to directly transmit 
data to the IRS.234 The sender must encrypt the data, and the IDES 
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encrypts the transmission pathway.235 The IRS also provides infor-
mation technology support known as Global IT Forum sessions to 
provide updates and answers to technical questions.236 
Ultimately, data protection and confidentiality is an important 
aspect of information exchange and is itself a competing priority.237 
The OECD model legal frameworks appear to offer jurisdictions 
more flexibility with respect to determining the terms of their agree-
ments or mutual administrative assistance.238 If a jurisdiction finds 
that the appropriate safeguards are not in place in a partner jurisdic-
tion or that there has been a breach in confidentiality, it may choose 
to suspend the exchange agreement.239 While Argentina is commit-
ted to participating in the exchange of information under the CRS 
and FATCA,240 its systemic corruption241 may be an obstacle in its 
performance, which may cause other jurisdictions to question 
whether appropriate data protection safeguards have been taken 
within Argentina’s domestic tax administration. On the other hand, 
participating in the global economy while committing to both trans-
parency and the exchange of information may improve Argentina’s 
governance and tax administration.242 
C. Argentina’s Legal Capacity to Comply: Data Protection Law 
in Argentina 
In 2000, Argentina enacted the Personal Data Protection Act 
(PDPA) Law No. 25,326 to regulate the usage of personal or sensi-
tive data by public and private individuals as well as legal entities.243 
The PDPA implements Argentina’s constitutional guarantees to data 
privacy by guaranteeing an individual’s right to data privacy and 
access to their data and creates a specific and affirmative cause of 
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action for individuals to enforce their rights.244 In pertinent part, the 
PDPA provides the following under Section 1: 
The purpose of this Act is the full protection of per-
sonal information recorded in data files, registers, 
banks or other technical means of data-treatment, ei-
ther public or private for purposes of providing re-
ports, in order to guarantee the honor and intimacy 
of persons, as well as the access to the information 
that may be recoded about such persons, in accord-
ance with the provisions of Section 43, Third Para-
graph of the National Constitution.245 
Argentina refers to its affirmative cause of action as amparo, 
which loosely means “shelter.”246 Amparo is a broad category of 
several causes of action and is enshrined under article 43 of Argen-
tina’s Constitution, amended in 1994.247 
Not only does an amparo cause of action enable an individual to 
obtain information about themselves held in public or private 
sources, it “may be filed to request the suppression, rectification, 
confidentiality or updating of said data.”248 A plaintiff may file an 
amparo complaint in the case of false data or discrimination.249 Am-
paro is codified under Section 16 of the PDPA, which closely mir-
rors constitutional language.250 Section 16 provides for the addi-
tional affirmative right of “Habeas Data” and may be used when 
“the person responsible for or the user of the data bank” is noncom-
pliant with a plaintiff’s initial amparo complaint to rectify, update, 
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suppress, or keep confidential their personal data.251 Amparo, as a 
constitutional guarantee and category of cause of action, is not new 
in Latin America.252 It exists in other Latin American countries as 
well as civil law countries such as Spain and Portugal.253 
Habeas Data, specifically, also exists in several Latin American 
countries such as Brazil, Paraguay, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru 
and is described as a procedural mechanism to “safeguard individual 
freedom from abuse in the information age.”254 Several priorities 
evident in the PDPA are (1) the consent, in most cases, of the indi-
vidual about whom information or data is being collected, (2) notice, 
notwithstanding whether consent is required, (3) the accuracy or 
truthfulness of the data collected or used, and (4) the limitation of 
data usage to the specific purpose for which it was collected.255 Ac-
cordingly, the PDPA declares “the rights of data subjects, the obli-
gations of data controllers and data users, the supervisory authority 
or controlling body, [and] sanctions and rules of procedure for the 
‘habeas data’ judicial remedy.”256 
In December 2001, Argentina issued regulations under Decree 
No 1.558/2001, Regulations of Law No. 25,326, to implement the 
PDPA.257 Additionally, the implementing regulations complete pro-
visions of the PDPA and clarify provisions that may be ambiguous 
or subject to interpretation.258 Together, Article 43.3 of the Argen-
tinean Constitution, the PDPA, and Decree No. 1558/2001 form the 
general legal framework of data protection law in Argentina.259 
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With respect to enforcement, the Argentine Personal Data Pro-
tection Agency (APDPA) oversees the enforcement of the PDPA.260 
Any public or private entity that uses data for non-personal uses 
must register its database with the APDPA in order to lawfully keep 
data.261 The APDPA may review complaints and affirmatively ini-
tiate investigations into PDPA violations.262 Moreover, the agency 
has sanctions at its disposal to punish PDPA violators, such as civil 
reprimands that may warn or suspend the violator’s use of such in-
formation, civil fines that range between $1,000 and $100,000, and 
criminal sanctions.263 Individuals may face criminal sanctions, such 
as imprisonment, for intentional acts like falsifying information or 
data within a database or repository.264 
While Argentina may have a sophisticated legal framework for 
data protection modeled after Spain’s Law on the Protection of Per-
sonal Data,265 and in line with the rich history of amparo and habeas 
data in Latin America, the country is amending its data protection 
law to align more with Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR).266 The GDPR is a comprehensive data protection law en-
acted by the EU.267 The GDPR was enacted in 2016 and is far reach-
ing because, once in force in 2018, it will effectively repeal and re-
place the data protection laws of individual EU member states.268 
The goal of the GDPR is to harmonize data privacy laws across Eu-
rope, reshape the way data privacy is approached in the region, and 
                                                                                                             
 260 McCleary, supra note 243, at 143. 
 261 McCleary, supra note 243, at 144. 
 262 McCleary, supra note 243, at 143. 
 263 McCleary, supra note 243, at 144. 
 264 McCleary, supra note 243, at 144. 
 265 Eustice & Bohn, supra note 257, at 2. 
 266 Sarah Buerger, How the GDPR Changed the Argentina Personal Data 
Protection Act, MICHALSONS (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://www.michalsons.com/blog/argentina-personal-data-protection-act/25090. 
 267 General Data Protection Regulation- A Heads Up, MICHALSONS (Dec. 7, 
2017), https://www.michalsons.com/focus-areas/privacy-and-data-protec-
tion/general-data-protection-regulation-a-heads-up [hereinafter General Data 
Protection Regulation]; accord John Giles, What is the GDPR and Why is it Im-
portant?, MICHALSONS (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.michalsons.com/blog/what-
is-the-gdpr/18552. 
 268 EU GDPR Portal: Site Overview, https://www.eugdpr.org (last visited 
Oct.10, 2018). 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 159 
 
lastly, protect the data privacy of all EU citizens.269 Because of the 
vast spread of the EU, the GDPR is considered the most important 
legislation on data protection in the world.270 
Generally, the GDPR defines the roles of the three key actors 
involved in the transfer of any data: the data subject, the controller, 
and the processor.271 Data subjects include only natural persons, not 
legal persons.272 Controllers are either natural or legal persons and 
are the entities that determine the purposes and conditions for pro-
cessing personal data.273 Lastly, the processor, a natural or legal per-
son, is the entity, like an IT vendor, which processes the data on 
behalf of the controller.274 Most of the GDPR applies to the obliga-
tions and conduct of controllers and the processors they use to law-
fully process personal data.275 
Argentina is aligning its PDPA with the GDPR because, alt-
hough it is not an EU member state, Argentina does business with 
the EU and is involved with EU member states through either tax 
treaties, like Spain, or through Multilateral Competent Authority 
Agreements (MCAA) to exchange financial account information 
under the CRS.276 Therefore, aligning its PDPA with the GDPR may 
benefit Argentina’s private, banking, and financial services sectors, 
its domestic tax administration, and its ability to perform under its 
exchange of information agreements with respect to tax matters. 
There are areas where the PDPA diverges from the GDPR.277 
For example, the PDPA defines data subjects differently, and it in-
cludes both natural and legal persons, whereas the GDPR only in-
cludes natural persons.278 Additionally, other areas that differ from 
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the GDPR were determined in 2002 by the EU’s Article 29 Working 
Party.279 The Working Party was established under Article 29 of the 
EU’s European Commission Directive 95/46/EC, and it is an inde-
pendent advisory body on data protection and privacy.280 The Work-
ing Party found several concerns with Argentina’s PDPA: (1) the 
PDPA inadequately protects the personal data and financial infor-
mation of data subjects in cross-border transfers, (2) too many ex-
ceptions exist to prohibitions on transferring personal data to juris-
dictions lacking appropriate levels of data protection, and (3) the 
National Directorate for Personal Data Protection (NDPDP) lacks 
sufficient independence from other entities within the Argentine 
government.281 However, despite the few weaknesses found in the 
PDPA, the Working Party found that Argentina ensures an adequate 
level of data protection within the meaning of Article 25(6) of the 
European Commission’s 1995 Directive on data protection.282 
V. CONCLUSION: THE CONFLUENCE OF CORRUPTION, 
GOVERNANCE, AND THE WILLINGNESS TO 
CHANGE 
The provisions for data protection within Argentina’s constitu-
tion, statute, and regulations provide an adequate legal framework 
for the protection of data according to the EU’s Article 29 Working 
Party.283 Also, the PDPA is similar in many respects to the EU’s 
GDPR, a colossal legal framework for data protection covering 
twenty-eight member states.284 It may be reasonable to say that Ar-
gentina’s legal framework is sophisticated based on EU standards 
and taking into account the overall tradition of habeas data and am-
paro in Latin America.285 Although there are a few weaknesses in 
the PDPA, it sufficiently provides Argentina with the statutory and 
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procedural means to keep exchanged tax information safe in accord-
ance with the OECD’s Keeping It Safe report.286 This is because un-
like other developing countries that may not possess the technolog-
ical or bureaucratic infrastructure for such enhanced tax administra-
tion and administration in general, Argentina does. 
However, while Argentina possesses the legal frameworks “on 
paper,” it remains to be seen whether it can execute its commitments 
under FATCA or the CRS or whether other countries with which 
Argentina has agreements or treaties trust in Argentina’s ability to 
safeguard the personal tax and financial information it exchanges. 
Argentina’s historical and current problems with systemic corrup-
tion, from grand to petty, in its institutions at the political and bu-
reaucratic level287 are serious impediments to meeting its commit-
ments. 
Moreover, as long as economic gains are consistently eroded by 
inflation, and barriers to competition and income inequality remain 
high, Argentines will continue to flock to the informal market to 
substitute their pesos for dollars, which wealthier Argentines would 
prefer to safeguard in foreign offshore accounts.288 Notwithstanding 
domestic policy, such as the ley de blanqueos offering amnesty to 
tax evaders,289 international introspection into Argentina’s tax ad-
ministration shows that there are holes, which may promote brib-
ery.290 As the 2017 OECD Working Group on Bribery found, Ar-
gentina is still noncompliant, and most relevant to its tax administra-
tion, it is implementing recommendations, training tax administra-
tors on detecting bribery, and amending its legislation to share tax 
information with foreign authorities for use in bribery investiga-
tions.291 
Also pertinent, there are repeated calls for Argentina to 
strengthen the independence of government entities that investigate 
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corruption.292 In order for Argentina to create the culture of care293 
necessary to protect data, it will need to ensure that policies and pro-
cedures for handling, transferring, and even disposing of infor-
mation are endorsed at the top level of tax administration and regu-
larly monitored for compliance.294 If Argentina cannot squarely 
tackle its problems with corruption, it may threaten the integrity of 
the new PDPA that the Argentine legislature is developing, and it 
may have a negative effect on Argentina’s international business 
dealings and exchange of information agreements or treaties with 
respect to protecting personal tax information. 
Argentina’s willingness to change, under the current Macri Ad-
ministration, is likely a good indicator that Argentina will honor its 
commitment to the U.S. under FATCA and to the respective coun-
tries with which it has entered into multilateral agreements with un-
der CRS. This is because Macri has worked with the Argentine leg-
islature to implement pro-market and fiscally conservative re-
forms.295 These reforms have focused on addressing rampant infla-
tion, the black market for pesos and the informal economy, tax eva-
sion, and government fraud with respect to pension programs.296 It 
appears that much of the domestic legal and political change Argen-
tina is experiencing is heavily influenced by external, international 
changes, such as the move toward more tax transparency and less 
bank secrecy. Additionally, Argentina’s desire to have access to in-
ternational finance and markets likely compels it to agree with the 
international consensus that bank secrecy destabilizes297 the interna-
tional economy. The importance of protecting and keeping confi-
dential personal tax and financial data compliments the international 
move toward transparency and the exchange of information. 
While Argentina has made commitments on different fronts per-
taining to data protection, the exchange of tax information, and re-
ducing corruption, there has not been a synchronized effort. The 
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OECD’s Keeping It Safe report recommends synchronizing domes-
tic laws pertaining to data protection with exchange of information 
treaties or agreements.298 
Despite the current status of Argentina’s efforts, it should have 
less difficulty complying with FATCA than CRS because of 
FATCA’s unilateral299 nature. FATCA generally is not concerned 
with exchanging data of foreign nationals residing in the U.S., but 
rather, FATCA is concerned with receiving the financial data of 
U.S. citizens and residents under U.S. jurisdiction for tax pur-
poses.300 Moreover, the IDES system streamlines the data transmis-
sion process and encrypts the data for FFIs and Host Country Tax 
Authorities (HCTA).301 On the other hand, Argentina may have 
more difficulty complying with its agreements under CRS because 
of the sheer number of countries it may be dealing with that may 
have different data protection standards. Additionally, Argentina’s 
current data protection framework may not meet the standards of 
certain EU member states, necessitating Argentina to alter its do-
mestic law.302 Nevertheless, the future may be very bright for Ar-
gentina because its efforts to keep up with the global movement for 
tax transparency and the exchange of tax information will likely im-
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